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Security for Cloud Environment through
Information Flow Properties Formalization with
a First-Order Temporal Logic
Re´sume´ : La principale cause de ralentissement de l’adoption du Cloud
est le manque de se´curite´ fiable. Le concept de se´curite´ a` la demande est de
de´ployer et d’appliquer les demandes de se´curite´ d’un client. Dans ce papier,
nous pre´sentons une approche, Information Flow Past Linear Time Logic (IF-
PLTL), qui permet de spe´cifier comment un syste`me peut supporter un large
ensemble de proprie´te´s de se´curite´. Nous pre´sentons dans ce papier comment ces
flux d’information peuvent eˆtre controˆler en utilisant les e´ve´nements syste`mes
de bas niveau. Nous donnons une description comple´te de la syntaxe de IF-
PLTL ainsi que sa se´mantique. De plus, cette logique permet de formaliser un
large ensemble de politiques de se´curite´. Notre approche est illustre´e par la
politique de se´curite´ de la muraille de Chine oriente´ vers le monde commercial.
Finalement, nous montrons comment nous avons e´tendu notre langage pour
supporter la relabe´lisation dynamique qui permet de supporter la dynamicite´
inhe´rante des syste`mes. Nous illustrons cette extension par la formalisation
d’une proprie´te´ de se´curite´ pour l’isolation dynamique de domaines.
Mots-cle´s : Cloud, Se´curite´, IaaS, Protection, Flux d’information, Logique
temporelle, Premier ordre
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1 Introduction
The main slowdown of Cloud activity comes from the lack of reliable secu-
rity [30, 41]. A Cloud environment faces a variety of threats from traditional
threats such as Operating System (OS) (at the hypervisor level or at the VM
OS level) or network attacks to new threats arising from having shared envi-
ronments e.g., shared hardware resources at the IaaS level [18], shared (virtual)
OS resources at the PaaS level [37], shared applications resources at the SaaS
level [19]. An efficient security policy must consider all layers of multitenancy
i.e., IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. Bringing security into Clouds is an active research do-
main witnessed by various academic and industrial on-going projects [1,33,43].
We believe a key concept is about delivering on-demand security. An user must
be able to specify what is the required secure behavior of his system. Hence,
we need to provide a language that allows the expression of specific security
requirements.
However, the process of specifying/configuring a security policy is usually
very complex and error-prone, as presented in [16]. Even with security exper-
tise, a human can still realize unintended misconfiguration leading to security
breaches. For this very reason, security policies should be enforced in an auto-
matic fashion i.e., where human intervention only occurs if strictly necessary.
The intended behavior of a system i.e., what a system should or should not do,
falls into human knowledge. Therefore, after an initial security specification,
the system must follow a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) approach where
even the root user cannot alter the specified security policy [28].
Halpern et al. [27] state that security policies described in a natural lan-
guage have quite ambiguous semantics. On the other hand, a formal language
(or logic) provides clear syntax and semantics.
In this paper, we propose a logic well-suited for a multitenant, concurrent
and non-deterministic system.
To be of practical use, a formal system must satisfy the following constraints:
1. It must model how information is exchanged, namely direct, transitive
and intransitive information flows.
2. It must model multi-domain, concurrent and non-deterministic systems.
3. It must be usable by non-logicians i.e., the IaaS client.
When correctly configured, many security mechanisms proved to be efficient
in practice e.g., SELinux, Iptables. Considering that an administrator should
not rely on a unique technology, a formal specification of security requirements
should be expressive enough to be mapped to the inner logic of those security
mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the three constraints
and motivates our work by reviewing existing security approaches. Section 3
describes how a system can be modeled as information flow traces. Section 4
describes both syntax and semantics of our Information Flow Past Linear Time
Logic (IF-PLTL). Section 5 exemplifies high-level properties with the Chinese
Wall. Section 6 extends IF-PLTL with annotations to dynamically force context
relabeling and use it to formalize a dynamic domains isolation policy. Finally,
Section 7 concludes with open questions and perspectives.
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2 Motivations
In this section, we motivate our proposal and explain where it is located in
the larger field of protection mechanisms and their underlying logics. First,
we discuss about the difference between Information Flow Control (IFC) and
Access Control (AC). Next, we differentiate two types of IFC: firstly included
in the programing models and secondly included in systems. Then we lay the
base of IFC logics and show the importance of having a usable and applicable
IFC logic. Finally, we give an overview of our approach.
2.1 Information Flow Control vs Access Control
Information Flow Control and Access Control can be seen as different but maybe
complementary approaches to security [31]. Access Control makes explicit state-
ments about permissions for a principal to realize a specific action on a resource
whereas information flows are implicit. IFC makes explicit statements about
permitted information flows whereas permissions for a specific action are im-
plicit. It is not easy to see if an AC policy can leak information to a potential
attacker and many studies have been lead in this direction, namely AC policy
analysis [8]. In recent work [36], AC policies differentiate permission (can do),
obligation (must do), denial (cannot do) and do not apply. Such refinement
does not exist in IFC where the objective is to understand and control how
information flows between entities that is how entities interfer with each others.
Information Flow (IF) properties are naturally temporal. A flow between
two entities is either allowed or denied depending on what flows previously
occurred. For example, in the property Alice can read File if Bob has never
written in File, permitting a flow between Alice and File is determined by the
existence of a previous flow between Bob and File. This is referred in the
literature as history-based IFC [4].
2.2 Direct, Transitive and Intransitive Information Flows
An IF policy between two entities can be either direct, transitive or intransitive.
Let suppose an IF policy allowing direct flows from entity A to B and from B
to C. A transitive policy would allow a direct flow from A to C by transitivity.
However, an intransitive policy would not allow a direct flow from A to C but
will allow a flow from A to C passing through B. These intransitive IF policies
are hard to specify [39] but are essential. Therefore, we must include them in
our formalization.
2.3 Language-based vs System-based IFC
IFC is studied at two levels. Language-based IFC focuses on flows inside a
program [40], for example, let secret and public be two variables. The statement
if secret then public := 1 creates an implicit flow between secret and public. It is
an invasive approach as it requires to expand the code with security annotations
to tag the different data. System-based IFC focuses on flows inside a system
e.g., an Operating System (OS); it controls the flow of information between the
entities of a system. System-based IFC is not invasive as it does not required a
modification of any applications. But it comes with a loss of granularity as it
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is not possible to differentiate variables inside a given application. This paper
deals with the System-based IFC.
2.4 Static analysis vs Dynamic monitoring
Information flow control systems tackle any environment from static systems
to (runtime) reference monitors. In the static case, IF properties are checked
against a complete model of the system, generally a non-deterministic automata.
This static analysis is done through model checking [24]. In the dynamic case,
IF policies are checked at runtime, that is whenever an event generates an
information flow, the IF reference monitor decides if this flow satisfies or not
the IF policy. Our approach is to propose a formal system encompassing both
the static and the dynamic case.
2.5 Roles, Levels, Clearances, Groups and Categories
Attaching labels (or tags) to entities of the system facilitates information control.
These labels expose meta-data to efficiently define security domains, types, roles,
etc. as well as includes the dynamicity from adding/removing entities.
IFC has been first introduced by Denning et al. in [22] with a Multi-Level
System (MLS). These levels are coming from the military domain where an
information from the top-secret level cannot flow to a low-clearance level or
only though declassification. The partial ordering between levels, represented
by a lattice, is quite used in IFC research [34]. It seems not straightforward
to apply such strict model to the IaaS Cloud multitenancy where one of the
basics is to share resources. Nonetheless, Multi-Domain Systems (MDS) [45]
has been proposed to tackle more flexible organizations and is more suitable
for Clouds. In this paper, we propose a non-hierarchical organization where
entities of a system can belong to multiple sets and it is up to the IaaS client to
semantically define these sets as roles, levels, clearances, groups or categories.
2.6 IFC Logic-based models
AC or IFC systems have been widely modeled with logics. In [27], Halpern
applies First-Order (FO) logic to digital rights management. Cassandra [7], a
role-based trust management system, specifies AC policies for large-scale sys-
tems. Cassandra is based on a logic-programming language, Datalog [29] with
constraints. Binder [23] extends Datalog to express distributed security state-
ments. Bruns et al. [17] propose a specification in Belnap logic for analyzable
AC policy composition. In [5], the authors specify and implement (Temporal)
Role-Based Access Control policies in constraint logic programming.
To our knowledge, the closest work from ours has been proposed by Basin
et al. in [6]. The authors propose a runtime monitoring with a Metric First-
Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL) and provide algorithms to enforce formulas.
Their approach is similar to our work in the way that MFOTL includes the
(Past)-Linear Time Logic temporal modalities and the system behavior is mod-
eled as (sets of) traces. Nonetheless, the authors’ proposal differ from our
proposition by not explicitly modeling information flows and by defining a set
of relations depending on the use case. We argue that a logic must define
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a finite (and fixed) set of relations and functions that can be applied to any
system-based IFC.
2.7 IFC Usability and Applicability
Using IFC in Clouds to enforce security requirements has been motivated [3,41]
but it has never been applied. In a large scale system like an IaaS Cloud, an IFC
system must cautiously consider what information to model and hence monitor
(in the dynamic case). In [38], Rushby encodes temporal execution with two
functions step and run which seem equivalent to our temporal modalities, but
a third function, content, is defined to express the information contained by
an object and hence observe changes in contents. To our opinion, it is not
feasible to remember the content of objects in a complex system such as an OS,
especially at different points in time.
In model-checking approaches, the question is how many states are needed
to represent a complex system. In such approaches, an automata-like mod-
elisation is required to represent the system’s behavior. This requirement is
time-consuming. Nonetheless, it has been applied to operating system policies
analysis [14,26]. An other weakness is when the automata changes, all analyses
must be redone. Accordingly, due to dynamicity and multitenancy of a Cloud,
it is too complex to statically verify security properties.
Usability is also an important factor when proposing new security ap-
proaches. Indeed, if describing security requirements is too complex, the se-
curity approach will not be used [2]. Accordingly, we propose an high-level API
composed of general security policies, each property being formally defined. The
IaaS client can pick the required security properties and parameterized it with-
out taking care of formally defining it. Nevertheless, an advanced client will be
able to formally define new security properties if required.
The formalization presented in this paper is based on the PIGA language [14,
21] but revisited to be more formal and general. The PIGA language has been
used to implement reference monitors in various environments such as:
• PIGA-OS [16], an operating system based on Linux modified to control
flows between entities (process, files, etc.).
• PIGA-Virt [15], it controls flows between virtual machines at the hyper-
visor layer.
• PIGA-Cluster [10], it outsources the protection mechanisms to a dedicated
node to avoid performance loss.
• PIGA-Dalvik [11], a SE-Dalvik Java monitor controlling flows between
Android applications.
PIGA-based systems proved to be efficient, PIGA-OS has won the french
national Security Challenge (aka. “De´fi de Se´curite´” from the ANR program
SEC&SI) where three security systems and research teams were both protecting
an operating system and attacking the others.
2.8 Our approach: Overview
In this section, we have discussed the following constraint It must model how
information is exchanged, namely direct, transitive and intransitive information
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flows and defined the scope of study to system-based IFC for static analysis
and dynamic monitoring. The second constraint It must model multi-domain,
concurrent and non-deterministic systems is motivated first by the Cloud mul-
titenant architecture. The last constraint It must be usable by non-logicians
i.e., the IaaS client is more intuitive and can be achieved by proposing a simple
high-level API.
As shown in Figure 1, the objective is to decide whether the system’s behav-
ior modeled as traces satisfies a security policy using logic formulas as formal
representation. A trace is a sequence of state transitions. A system does not di-
rectly produce information flows but low-level observable events instead. These
events are transformed into functional events and finally into Information Flows
(IF). An IF-trace satisfies (or not) a security policy i.e., a set of closed formulas
called a theory. Finally, a user-friendly API is provided as a set of high-level
properties with parameters, the example of the Chinese Wall policy being given
in Section 5 and 6.
Figure 1: Overview of the satisfaction of a model by logic formulas
3 System Model: Traces
In this section, we present how to construct IF-traces over low-level events.
To define security in an IaaS Cloud composed of virtual and physical OSes,
we must represent a concurrent and non-deterministic system. Let first propose
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the following definitions:
Definition 1 (Primitive System) A blackbox with an internal state τ and
an interface accepting a set of actions.
Definition 2 (System) A (recursive) composition of primitive systems (or
systems).
System behavior as traces Every entity inside the Operating System (OS)
environment can be viewed as systems e.g., files, processes, databases. Each
virtual machine is also a subsystem of the Cloud. A concurrent system be-
havior can be modeled by all execution traces generated by this system [32],
where an execution trace is a sequence of state transitions. We give afterwards
a general definition (Definition 4) of traces including the concept of observer
(Definition 3). Let suppose a system with only three entities (a,b,c). a has a
partial trace including all events from or to itself but does not see events be-
tween b and c. Moreover, an event from a to b is both in a and b traces. As a
result, the union of all partial traces forms a complete trace of the system.
Definition 3 (Observer) A passive entity with a system view (potentially
partial).
Definition 4 (Trace) Sequence of state transitions triggered by events, as
viewed by an observer.
Contexts As entities are heterogeneous, they are identified using contexts
(Definition 5). We suppose the existence of a method to map a context to
every entity where two entities with the same context have a set of common
characteristics e.g., behavior, security domain, type. In the following, we note
SC the set of all contexts.
SC: set of all contexts.
Definition 5 (Context) Abstract concept to refer to entities with a (set of)
common characteristic(s).
Inria
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3.1 Traces with Observable Events
The kernel has a complete view of all traces of the operating system. Kernel
calls e.g., sys read, sys write, sys fork, are made from an entity to another (po-
tentially newly created in the fork case). In current Linux kernels, the Linux
Security Module (LSM) [46] provides all needed kernel hooks. However, these
hooks only occur before system calls and cannot see whenever a call ends. These
pre-call hooks are not sufficient to represent the duration of an event and a
fortiori the concurrency between two overlapping calls. In the following, we
suppose to be able to capture begin and end events of any call. One should note
it is possible to implement such module in any (Linux) kernel [9].
An observable event (Definition 6) is an atomic event viewed by an observer
e.g., the kernel.
EOP : set of elementary operations (begin read, . . . )
OE : set of observable events (SC × EOP × SC)
Definition 6 (Observable Event)
oe ∈ OE ≡def (a, eop, b) where
{
a, b ∈ SC
eop ∈ EOP
The low-level trace (Definition 7) produced by the system is a set of ob-
servable events. Figure 2 shows an example of trace for a system composed of
three entities (a, b, c), a read operation has finished and a write operation is still
occurring (no ending event).
Definition 7 (Trace of observable events)
T ≡def {oe1, oe2, . . . , oen} where oei ∈ OE
Figure 2: Trace of observable events
3.2 Traces with Functional Events
With begin and end events, we can build the corresponding functional event
(Definition 8) including the functional operation e.g., read, write. An entity
is able to perform multiple functional operations in parallel. Let suppose a
context a is reading twice a context b e.g., two entities with the context a read
a file with the context b. To correctly associate the end event and the begin
event, an observer must discriminate the two parallel read operations even if the
sources and the destinations are identical. Therefore, we suppose two functions
is begin event and is end event, determining respectively if an observable event
oei is the beginning of a functional operation op and if an observable event oej
is the ending of a functional operation op starting with oei.
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All events in the functional trace (Definition 9) are in the set FE and all
operations in the set FO.
FO : set of functional operations (read, write, . . . )
FE : set of functional events (SC × FO × SC)
The two functions is begin event and is end event are defined as follows:
is begin event: OE × FO → {true, false}
is end event: OE ×OE → {true, false}
Definition 8 (Functional Event)
∀k ∈ [i, j], (a, op, b)k ∈ FE ≡def

a, b ∈ SC, op ∈ FO
∃i′ ≤ i, oei′ = (a, eopbegin, b)i′ ∧ is begin event(oei′ , op)
∃j′ ≥ j, oej′ = (a, eopend, b)j′ ∧ is end event(oej′ , oei′)
Definition 9 (Trace of functional events) T ≡def {fe1, fe2, . . . , fen}
where fei ∈ FE
Figure 3 is the result of projecting observable events of Figure 2 into func-
tional events. In this trace, the first observable event (a, begin read, b) and
third observable event (a, end read, b) is transformed into a functional event
(a, read, b) occurring at every instant between the beginning and the end in-
cluded.
Figure 3: Trace of functional events
3.3 Traces with Information Flows
Information flow models differ by their expressiveness and their relations.
Nonetheless, we can outline two common relations/operators:
• The flow-to relation e.g., an information flows from a to b.
• The relabeling operator e.g., an entity labeled with a is relabeled with b.
In our opinion, the last operator comes in two flavor depending who is is-
suing the relabeling, an entity or the observer. Our definition of an observer
(Definition 3) only allows it to evaluate whether or not traces satisfies a given
security policy. In this case, the relabeling operation must be initiated by enti-
ties, this operation is called a transition e.g., an entity wants to transit from a
to b.
We consider the three relations in our information flow traces:
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• A flow from a to b is defined as (a > b)
• An anti-flow i.e., the absence of flow, from a to b is defined as (a 6> b)
• A transition from a to b is defined as (a >t b)
To transform functional events into information flows, we introduce three
functions determining if an arbitrary functional operation (op ∈ FO) is equiv-
alent to a read, a write or a transition operation:
is read like: FO → {true, false}
is write like: FO → {true, false}
is trans like: FO → {true, false}
The informal semantics of the previous operations are:
• a reads from b: information flows from b to a.
• a writes to b: information flows from a to b.
• a transits to b.
Definitions 10, 11, 12 formally define the three relations (>, 6>,>t) using the
functions is read like, is write like, is trans like.
Definition 10 (Flow-to Relation) (a > b) ∈ IF ≡def ∃op ∈
FO


((b, op, a) ∧ is read like(op))
∨
((a, op, b) ∧ is write like(op))
Definition 11 (Anti-flow Relation)
(a 6> b) ≡def ¬(a > b)
Definition 12 (Transition Relation)
(a >t b) ∈ IF ≡def ∃op ∈ FO((a, op, b) ∧ is trans like(op))
Figure 4 is the result of projecting functional events in Figure 3 into infor-
mation flows. (a, read, b) and (c, write, b) are substituted by (a < b) and (c > b)
respectively.
Figure 4: Trace of information flows
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3.4 Summary
Instead of directly dealing with IF-traces, we have shown how to obtain them
over more concrete traces. The two functions is begin event and is end event are
sufficient to model continuous operations (functional events) over atomic ones
(observable events). Then, with the three functions is read like, is write like
and is trans like, we have described how to finally obtain IF-traces.
The reader should note that despite we used the OS/kernel example, the
approach is not limited to this type of systems and has been historically applied
to mobile systems (Android), clusters and hypervisors with the PIGA engine [9].
4 Security Properties: Temporal Logic
A set of execution traces of a system is either statically generated from a
model e.g., a state machine, a petri net, or dynamically produced at runtime.
In the static case, we obtain a set of (potentially) infinite traces representing
all possible executions viewed by an observer. In the dynamic case, we obtain a
unique finite trace per observer representing the history of the current execution.
A security property is expressed as a property on traces. The same security
property must be satisfiable in both the static and the dynamic case. Let takes
an example of a trace property, the reachability problem. It is defined as follows:
Does it exist an execution (a trace) where a given state is reached i.e., it appears
in the trace. It is clear that such trace property is satisfiable in the static case
but not in the dynamic case. In fact in the second, the trace only represents what
has occurred but never what will occur. Therefore, the answer is no until the
state is reached. Generally, any property that requires to know the existence of
a future state is not satisfiable for dynamic traces. Indeed, with dynamic traces,
it is not possible to know in advance the next state of the system.
Definition 13 (Trace Property) A set of infinite traces.
Definition 14 (Trace Hyperproperty) A set of trace properties i.e., a set
of sets of traces.
We consider the same definitions (Definition 13 and 14) of properties on
traces as defined by Clarkson et al. in [20]. The trace property is expressed
on traces that comes from a single observer whereas a trace hyperproperty is
expressed on sets of traces that come from multiple observers.
4.1 Temporal Many-Sorted Logic with Information Flow
In order to model trace properties, we need a many-sorted first-order temporal
logic on information flows. A temporal logic implicitly defines the flow of time
over which formulas are evaluated. A first-order logic allows to use quantifiers
to express properties such as: There is a context a from which flows are ini-
tiated. And finally, a many-sorted logic, as opposed to a single-sorted logic,
allows to define several sorts of domains instead of an homogeneous domain of
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discourse over which a quantifier iterates. Using sorts allows us to easily dis-
tinguish contexts and domains without requiring to use a second-order logic.
In the following, we first give general definitions of a many sorted signature
i.e., the non-logical symbols of a many-sorted logic, to further detail the con-
crete signature of IF-PLTL.
Let describe a many-sorted signature (Definition 15).
Definition 15 (Many-Sorted Signature) A many-sorted signature is a tu-
ple Σ = (S,C, F, P ) where:
• S = {σ1, . . . , σn} where n > 0 and σi is a sort.
• C = {c1, . . . , cn} where n ≥ 0 and ci is a constant symbol of sort σ ∈ S.
• F = {f1, . . . , fn} where n ≥ 0 and fi is a function symbol of arity m ≥ 0
with sorts (σ1 × . . .× σm)→ σ where σi ∈ S and σ ∈ S.
• P = {p1, . . . , pn} where n ≥ 0 and pi is a predicate symbol of arity m ≥ 0
with sorts (σ1 × . . .× σm) where σi ∈ S.
Past-LTL We can make implicit temporal information by using PLTL (Past-
LTL) modalities [12, 35]. (P-)LTL is a well-known formalism to express safety
and liveness properties in concurrent systems. Clarkson et al. stated that a
security property is an intersection between a safety and a liveness property. As
a many-sorted logic is well-suited to specify IF properties, (P-)LTL is well-suited
to express temporal IF properties.
PLTL modalities are the following:
1. X(φ) (Next): φ has to hold at the next state.
2. G(φ) (Globally in the future): φ has to hold on the entire subsequent
path.
3. F (φ) (Eventually in the future): φ eventually has to hold (somewhere
on the subsequent path).
4. (φ)U(ϕ) (Until): φ has to hold until ϕ holds.
5. Y (φ) (Previous): φ had to hold at the previous state.
6. H(φ) (Globally in the past): φ had to hold on the entire subsequent
path.
7. P (φ) (Eventually in the past): φ eventually had to hold (somewhere
on the subsequent path).
8. (φ)S(ϕ) (Since): φ had to hold since ϕ held.
4.2 IF-PLTL Syntax
The syntax describes how to construct well-formed formulas of our logic. A
formulae is well-formed when it is part of our formal language. In other words,
a non-well-formed formula cannot be interpreted by our system.
We first give the signature for temporal information flows and then describe
the formation rules.
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Signature ΣIF−PLTL = (S,C, F, P )
S = {ctx, dom}
C = ∅
F = ∅
P =
{>,≫, 6>,>t : ctx× ctx
∈, /∈ : ctx× domain
∈, /∈ : domain× domain}
We consider two sorts ctx and dom to designate contexts and domains
i.e., sets of contexts. Similarly to IF-traces, IF relations (>, 6>,>t) are nat-
urally defined between contexts. We also introduce the indirect flow relation
(≫) semantically distinguished from a direct flow (>). This indirect flow does
not exist in IF-traces but can be infered from a sequence of direct flows. For
example, the IF-trace in Figure 4 satisfies the property c≫ a at the second and
third instants because of the indirection c > b and b > a.
The set membership relations (∈, /∈) are firstly defined between a context and
a domain but also between domains to allow the specification of hierarchical sets.
For example, suppose a context a, a domain Set and a domain SuperSet, we
can define hierarchical relations where a ∈ Set is true, Set ∈ SuperSet is true
and a ∈ SuperSet is false.
Formation rules
Σ-TERM t ::= xσ | cσ | f(t1, . . . , tn) where

xσ is a variable of sort σ.
cσ is a constant symbol of sort σ.
f : σ1 × . . .× σn → σ is a function symbol
with Σ-TERM ti of sort σi.
Σ-ATOM a ::= p(t1, . . . , tn) where p : σ1 × . . .× σn
is a predicate symbol with ti Σ-TERM of sort σi.
Σ-FORMULAE ϕ ::= a | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 |
ϕ1 → ϕ2 | ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 | ∀σxϕ(x) | ∃σxϕ(x) | X(ϕ) |
Y (ϕ) | ϕ1Uϕ2 | ϕ1Sϕ2
where a is a Σ-ATOM and x a variable of sort σ
The derived modalities are defined as follows:
Fϕ ≡ ⊤Uϕ
Gϕ ≡ ¬F¬ϕ
Pϕ ≡ ⊤Sϕ
Hϕ ≡ ¬P¬ϕ
We give some abbreviations for simplicity in formulas expression:
(∀x ∈ y)ϕ(x) ≡ (∀x)(x ∈ y)→ ϕ(x)
(∃x ∈ y)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x)(x ∈ y) ∧ ϕ(x)
(a /∈ s) ≡ ¬(a ∈ s)
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Well-formed formulae Let give an example of a well-formed formulae:
G((∀ctxa, b)(∃doms)(a > b) ∧ (a ∈ s)→ (b ∈ s))
This formulae states that: At every moment k of the execution, for any pair
a, b of contexts, there is a domain s such as if information flows from a to b
and a is in domain s, then b is also in domain s. To simplify the notation,
we will suppose sorts to be implicitly defined. For example, in the formulae
(∀a, b)(a > b), a, b are of sort ctx, the relation > being only defined between
contexts.
Deduction rules The purpose of deduction rules is to make proofs and the-
orems e.g., proving the equivalence between formulas. We dispose of all classic
rules of the FO-logic (Hilbert system), of PLTL and Table 1 describes arguments
for the four information flow relations (>, 6>, >t, ≫). The simplified notation
(a > b)i describes the relation > between variables a, b (implicitly of sort ctx)
at moment i.
Name Sequent
Intransitive flow (a > b)i ∧ (b > c)j , i ≤ j ⊢ (a≫ c)j
Anti-flow introduction ¬(a > b)i ⊢ (a 6> b)i
Anti-flow elimination (a 6> b)i ⊢ ¬(a > b)i
Transition flow implication (a >t b)i ⊢ (a > b)i
Transitive transition flow (a >t b)i ∧ (b >t c)i ⊢ (a >t c)i
Table 1: Derived arguments forms
4.3 IF-PLTL Semantics
The semantic describes how to evaluate any well-formed formulae of IF-PLTL.
First, we define a FO many-sorted structure (Definition 16) obtained at ev-
ery moment of the execution; there is no temporal notions in such structure.
Next, we define a FO temporal structure (Definition 17) interpreting the flow
of time. Then, we give the definition of the satisfaction relation (|=) between
an IF-PLTL structure and an IF-PLTL formulae. Finally, we exemplify what
an interpretation is with a non-interference property.
A FO many-sorted structure M′ is composed of a domain D and an in-
terpretation function I. The domain is a set of all objects of sorts ctx, dom.
The interpretation function defines the meaning of all symbols appearing in a
formulae (without temporal modalities).
Definition 16 (A First-Order Many-Sorted Structure)
A FO-many-sorted ΣIF−PLTL-structure (or model) is a tuple M
′ = (D, I) with:
1. D =
⋃
σ∈S Dσ a many-sorted domain with Dσ a non empty domain.
∀σ1, σ2 ∈ S,Dσ1 ∩ Dσ2 = ∅.
2. I an interpretation function over D satisfying the following properties:
(a) Each sort σ ∈ S is mapped to a non empty domain Dσ.
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(b) Each constant symbol c ∈ C of sort σ is mapped to an element cI ∈
Dσ.
(c) Each function symbol f ∈ F of sorted arity σ1 × . . . × σn → σ is
mapped to a function fI : Dσ1 × . . .×Dσn → Dσ.
(d) Each predicate symbol p ∈ P of sorted arity σ1 × . . .× σn is mapped
to a subset pI ⊆ Dσ1 × . . .×Dσn .
A FO temporal structure M is composed of a flow of time F , the same
domain D and a function A associating every moment of the execution to a FO
many-sorted structure previously introduced.
Definition 17 (A First-Order Temporal Structure)
A FO-temporal ΣIF−PLTL-structure (or model) is defined by M =
〈
F ,D,A
〉
with:
1. F =
〈
T,<
〉
a strict linear order representing intended flow of time with
T ⊆ N.
2. D =
⋃
σ∈S Dσ a many-sorted domain with Dσ a non empty domain.
∀σ1, σ2 ∈ S,Dσ1 ∩ Dσ2 = ∅.
3. A a function associating with every moment k ∈ T a first-order many-
sorted structure A(k) =
〈
D, Ik
〉
with Ik the interpretation at moment
k.
We use the notation (M, k) for the FO many-sorted structure at moment k.
The satisfaction relation (or truth-relation) (M, k) |= ϕ between a model
(structure) M and a formula ϕ at the moment k is defined as follows:
(M, k) |= (a > b) iff (a > b) ∈ Ik(>)
(M, k) |= (a >t b) iff (a >t b) ∈ I
k(>t)
(M, k) |= (a ∈ s) iff (a ∈ s) ∈ Ik(∈)
(M, k) |= (a 6> b) iff (M, k) |= ¬(a > b)
(M, k) |= (a≫ b) iff ∃i, j, (0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k), ∃ctxc,

(M, j) |= (c > b)
and
(M, i) |= (a > c) ∨ (a≫ c)
(M, k) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, k) 6|= ϕ
(M, k) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff (M, k) |= ϕ1 and (M, k) |= ϕ2
(M, k) |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff (M, k) |= ϕ1 or (M, k) |= ϕ2
(M, k) |= ϕ1 → ϕ2 iff (M, k) |= ¬ϕ1 or (M, k) |= ϕ2
(M, k) |= ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 iff (M, k) |= ϕ1 → ϕ2
and (M, k) |= ϕ2 → ϕ1
(M, k) |= ∀σxϕ(x) iff (M, k) |= ϕ[x
I/x]
for all xI ∈ Dσ
(M, k) |= ∃σxϕ(x) iff (M, k) |= ϕ[x
I/x]
for some xI ∈ Dσ
(M, k) |= Xϕ iff k + 1 < |T | and (M, k + 1) |= ϕ
(M, k) |= Y ϕ iff 0 < k and (M, k − 1) |= ϕ
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(M, k) |= ϕ1Uϕ2 iff ∃i, (k ≤ i < |T |),

(M, i) |= ϕ2
and
∀j, (k ≤ j < i), (M, j) |= ϕ1
(M, k) |= ϕ1Sϕ2 iff ∃i, (0 ≤ i ≤ k),

(M, i) |= ϕ2
and
∀j, (i < j ≤ k), (M, j) |= ϕ1
Satisfiability As previously explained, the existence of a future state is unsat-
isfiable for a dynamic trace (constructed as events occur). Therefore, using the
modalities F,X,U, S may leads to unsatisfiability. Accordingly, we will prefer
their past counter-part.
Observation 1 In the general case, a model M at moment k can satisfy a
theory Th (set of closed formulas), but not at moment k + 1.
(M, k) |= Th 6=⇒ (M, k + 1) |= Th
Observation 2 In the general case, a model M would not satisfy a theory Th
at moment k, but could at moment k + 1.
(M, k) 6|= Th 6=⇒ (M, k + 1) 6|= Th
Let clarify observations 1 and 2. Suppose a theory forbidding information
to directly flow from an entity a to another entity b i.e., (a 6> b). If at moment
k, a has never sent any information to b, then the theory is satisfied. Now, if
a sends information to b at moment k + 1, then the property is not satisfied,
which concludes Observation 1. In the opposite, suppose a theory compelling
information to directly flow from an entity a to another entity b that is (a > b).
If at moment k, a has never sent any information to b, then the theory is not
satisfied. Now, if a sends information to b at moment k + 1, then the property
is satisfied, which concludes Observation 2.
Instant k 1 2 3 4 5
Trace (a > b) (f > e) (b > f) (f > d) (c >t f)
Ik(>) {(a > b)} {(f > e)} {(b > f)} {(f > d)} {(c > f)}
Ik(>t) ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {(c >t f)}
Ik(∈) D1 = {a, b, c} idem idem idem idem
D2 = {d, e}
D3 = {f}
D1 : |D2 true true true false true
Table 2: Interpretation and satisfaction of the non-interference between D1 and
D2.
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Isolation and Non-interference An important problem in Clouds is the
isolation between tenants. Goguens and Meyers [25] define the isolation property
based on two non-interference properties. The authors denote by D1 : |D2 that
a group D1 of users does not interfere with a group D2 of users and the isolation
between D1 and D2 is defined as a mutual non-interference i.e., D1 : |D2 and
D2 : |D1. In terms of information flows, the non-interference property D1 : |D2
means that information cannot directly or indirectly flow from D1 to D2 which
can be translated as ∀u1 ∈ D1, ∀u2 ∈ D2,¬((u1 ≫ u2) ∨ (u1 > u2)).
Let show an example of interpretation with the non-interference property.
Let suppose the scenario shown in Figure 5. The figure should be read as follows:
At time 1, information flow from a to b, then at time 2, information flow from
f to e and similarly for times 3 and 4. At time 5, there is a transition from c
to f meaning the entity labeled as c wants to be relabeled as f . Table 5 details
for any moment k the interpretation of each relation (>,>t,∈).
Figure 5: IF-Scenario with three groups (D1, D2, D3) and six entities
(a, b, c, d, e, f)
We have motivated the use of a temporal many-sorted logic with information
flows and introduced the IF-PLTL syntax and semantics. Moreover, we have
shown how to specify a non-interference property in IF-PLTL and verify it
against an IF-trace.
5 High-level Security Properties
In this section, we formalize the Chinese Wall policy in IF-PLTL to be
usable as an high-level API function.
With IF-PLTL, an administrator (or IaaS client) can specify a wide range
of IF security properties. For example, Property 1 is a simple property stating
that a formulae occurs at most once during the execution. The property is
constructed as follows: for all moments of the execution (G), if formulae ϕ is
satisfied then ϕ is not satisfied at any previous moment (YP).
Property 1 (At most one occurence)
1MAX(ϕ)⇔ G(ϕ→ Y P (¬ϕ))
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Our formalization allows to specify more complex properties. The Chinese
Wall policy was first introduced by Brewer and Nash [13] and more recently
revisited to be less restrictive [42, 44]. In the following, we only discuss Brewer
and Nash model.
In the commercial world, a market analyst working for a financial institution
is provided with confidential information from his firm’s clients. But advising
concurrent corporations with insider knowledge creates a conflict of interest and
must be forbidden. Therefore, such analyst is free to advise corporations which
are not in competition. In the initial model, the authors distinguish subjects
e.g., a market analyst and objects e.g., companies information. As shown in
Figure 6, corporation information are stored in hierarchical sets. Individual
objects are grouped into company datasets and each dataset belongs to a conflict
of interest class. For example, suppose three companies Bank-1, Bank-2 and
Telecom-1; there is two classes of interest. Bank-1 and Bank-2 datasets belong
to the banking class of interest and Telecom-1 dataset belong to the telecom
class of interest. An analyst cannot access both Bank-1 and Bank-2 datasets
but can freely access Telecom-1 datasets.
Figure 6: Composition of objects in the Chinese Wall policy
The Chinese Wall policy is axiomatized with four properties:
1. If any object o1 and o2 belongs to the same company dataset then they
also belong to the same conflict of interest class.
2. Access to any object or by a subject s is granted if and only if for all
previously accessed objects oc (by s), or and oc are in the same company
dataset or in different conflict of interest classes.
3. No previous access to any objects by any subjects is an initially secure
state.
4. Any access by a subject s is granted if he has never accessed any objects
before.
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To represent this policy in IF-PLTL, we define four sets of entities:
• S, the set of subjects.
• O, the set of objects.
• CDs, the set of company datasets.
• COIs, the set of conflict of interest classes.
Then we translate the four Chinese Wall policy axioms into our IF-PLTL
language respectively in Axiom 1,2,3,4. And the Chinese Wall is formalized as
a trace property in the Property 2.
Axiom 1 Axiom1(S,O,CDs,COIs)⇔
G
(
(∀o1, o2 ∈ O)(∃CDi ∈ CDs)(o1, o2 ∈ CDi)→
(∃COIj ∈ COIs)(o1, o2 ∈ COIj)
)
Axiom 2 Axiom2(S,O,CDs,COIs)⇔
(∀o ∈ O)(∀s ∈ S)
G
(
((s > o) ∨ (o > s))→ Y H(
(∀o′ ∈ O)((s > o′) ∨ (o′ > s))→
((∃CDi ∈ CDs)(o, o
′ ∈ CDi)
∨ (∀COIj ∈ COIs)(o, o
′ /∈ COIj))
)
)
Axiom 3 In the initial statement of the Chinese Wall policy, the authors model
accesses with an access matrix. This axiom states that for every couple (subject,
object), having the access matrix initialized at false is a secure state. In our
model, an access must occur at a moment k during the execution. In particular,
the existence of an access in an empty trace is false. As a result, this axiom is
already implicit with our structure.
Axiom 4 Axiom4(S,O,CDs,COIs)⇔
(∀o ∈ O)(∀s ∈ S)G
(
((s > o) ∨ (o > s))→ (∀o′ ∈ O)Y H((s 6> o′) ∧ (o′ 6> s))
)
Property 2 (Chinese-Wall) CWSP (S,O,CDs,COIs)
⇔ Axiom1 ∧ (Axiom2 ∨Axiom4)
Consequently, an IaaS client just has to call the high-level API function
CWSP with user-defined parameters (S,O,CDs,COIs). For example:
S = {ctx analyst}
O = {ctx data bank1, ctx data bank2, ctx data telecom1}
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CDs = {CD Bank1, CD Bank2, CD Telecom1}
CD Bank1 = {ctx data bank1}
CD Bank2 = {ctx data bank2}
CD Telecom1 = {ctx data telecom1}
COIs = {COI Bank,COI Telecom}
COI Bank = {CD Bank1, CD Bank2}
COI Telecom = {CD Telecom1}
6 Dynamicity: Sets Operators
As illustrated by the non-interference example (Figure 5 and Table 5), the
interpretation of sets relation (∈) is identical at any moment k. Moreover,
there is no function nor relation allowing to change this interpretation during
the execution i.e., modifying sets membership. In the following, we present a
policy, domains isolation, where dynamic sets could be of great interests and
then detail our proposition based on annotations in formulas and finally describe
the dynamic domains isolation policy. Indeed, dynamic sets are necessary to
increase the flexibility of property and being able to create properties that take
into account the dynamicity of systems.
Let suppose a strict domains isolation policy defined by Property 3 where
two entities (a, b) can only exchange information if they are in the same domain
(Domi). With such policy, an entity which does not belong to any domains
cannot send any information at all. Therefore, all entities must be properly
labelled with a domain which is a complex and time-consuming task.
Property 3 (Domains Isolation)
DI(DOMs)⇔ (∀a, b)G((a > b)→ (∃Domi ∈ DOMs)(a, b ∈ Domi))
Let consider the scenario depicted in Figure 7. A company outources its
services in the Cloud. This company has two departments, R&D and human re-
sources (HR), and each department has confidential data. The R&D dept. has a
project manager database (project data). The HR dept. has all employees pri-
vate information (employees data). Because of the R&D branch, the company
has to test unstable releases of a software (unstable app) which is unsafe and
must be isolated from other services. Also, the company is sometimes required to
test external programs they do not trust (untrusted app). Finally, the company
dispose of several applications (company app1, company app2) that may change
over time e.g., adding company app3. The company policy states that an ap-
plication cannot access both R&D and HR domains but it does not have any
a priori knowledge of whom the application is for. The idea is to contaminate
applications with the domain they belong to at the first access e.g., including
company app1 in R&D if it tries to access project data.
Our dynamic domains isolation policy is specified with three properties. Let
suppose DOMs to contain domains and sanboxes, then information can flow
from a context a to a context b if :
1. a, b are in the same set Domi (in DOMs). This is the static domains
isolation (Property 3).
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Figure 7: Scenario for dynamic domains isolation with different department
services.
Table 3: Dynamic Domains Isolation rules for (a > b)
b \ a Domi Domj Sandboxk Sandboxl None
Domi ⊤ ⊤
Domj ⊤ ⊤
Sandboxk ⊤ ⊤
Sandboxl ⊤ ⊤
None ⊤[[[Domi]]] ⊤[[[Domj ]]] ⊤[[[Sandboxk]]] ⊤[[[Sandboxl]]] ⊤
2. or a is not in any sets.
3. or a is in a set Domi and b is not in any sets, then b is now member of
Domi.
We propose the syntax ϕ[[[Annotation]]] meaning, Annotation is realized
when ϕ is true. An annotation to change sets membership would be [[[S ←
S
⋃
{x}]]] that is x becomes a member of S.
In Table 3, we detail restrictions on flows depending on the source (a) / des-
tination (b) and dynamic operations to realize. By ⊤, we denote an allowed flow
(denied when empty). The notation ⊤[[[Domi]]] means that the flow from a to b
is allowed and from now on, context b belongs to domain Domi. Three different
sets are distinguished, namely Doms (R&D, HumanResources), Sandboxes
(TestingEnv, Others) and None including every context neither in any Doms
nor in any Sandboxes e.g., company app1. Property 4 is the translation of the
three properties in IF-PLTL.
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Property 4 (Dynamic Domains Isolation)
DDI(DOMs)⇔

DI(DOMs)
∨(∀a, b)G((a > b)→ (∀Domi ∈ DOMs)(a /∈ Domi))
∨(∀a, b)(∃Domi ∈ DOMs)G
(
((a > b)→ (a ∈ Domi)
∧(∀Domj ∈ DOMs)(b /∈ Domj))[[[Domi ← Domi
⋃
{b}]]]
)
We have shown the benefits of using annotations to extend our logic with
dynamic relabelling. Furthermore, annotations can be used for specifying active
capabilities to the (no longer) passive observer.
7 Conclusion
First, we have motivated the need of a formal IFC language for distributed
and parallel systems and show the difference between our approach and previ-
ous ones. Then we have presented our formal language that allows to express
advanced security properties related to the control of different types of informa-
tion flow. Our approach distinguishes direct, transitive, and intransitive flows.
Using those operators our Information Flow Past Linear Time Logic (IF-PLTL)
enables to express various security properties or policies such as the noninter-
ference or the Chinese Wall. Furthermore, we have shown how IF-trace can be
constructed from low-level events happening on a system. To ease the usage
of IF-PLTL, we have proposed a high-level API that can be used and parame-
terized by IaaS client to express their security requirements. Finally, we have
shown how we have extended IF-PLTL to take into account the dynamicity
of systems and propose a new security policy called Dynamic Domains Isola-
tion. Despite that the underlying idea has already been used in various systems
like PIGA-OS and PIGA-Virt, it is the first time that the PIGA language is
transposed into a formal logic approach.
In the future, we will propose methods to ensure the composability of dif-
ferent properties. We will also work on how IF-PLTL properties can be split
to be used by a set of collaborating observers, in particular, with observers at
different Cloud layers (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS). An interesting work would be to
determine whether an IF-PLTL theory is coherent or not.
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